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Abstract 
Evidence of Political Budget Cycles from cross-countries studies has been rationalized as 
coming from voter’s cost to process available information and asymmetric information. 
This explanation was also adopted in most cross-province studies leaving aside variables 
related to the incentive structure of fiscal federalism. This paper investigates electorally-
induced fiscal fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1985-2007. Province –level dynamic 
panel data reveals that vertical fiscal imbalances in subnational districts fuel fiscal 
expansion and changes in expenditure composition, favoring current expenditure in 
detriment of investment, in election years.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Retaining political power is one of the main goals of incumbent parties. Politicians devote 
a lot of effort and rely on a wide variety of strategies, including budget manipulation, to 
help their parties (or themselves) to remain in office. The available evidence on political 
motivated budget cycles based on subnational level studies finds that incumbents from 
developing as well as from developed countries increase public outlays, change the 
expenditure mix and avoid taxing their constituencies in election years. This opportunistic 
behavior is usually explained resorting to different degrees of voter awareness, voter’s 
costs to process information and low transparency fiscal policy. That is, variables related 
to the democracy maturity hypotheses that usually stem from cross-country studies, 
leaving aside a more obvious candidate for subnational level studies: the incentive from 
rules governing the distribution of resources and spending between the central 
government and subnational districts in a federation.  
This paper investigates the role of the incentive structure of fiscal federalism in electoral-
induced budget fluctuations for the case of Argentina. In particular, I focus on vertical 
fiscal imbalance (henceforth, VFI), a distinctive feature of Argentine fiscal federalism, 
generated by sizable transfers from the central government to the provinces. As pointed 
out by Saiegh and Tommasi (1999), large vertical fiscal imbalances in most sub national 
districts result in perverse incentives to local authorities and citizens. On one hand, local 
politicians enjoy a large share of the political benefit of spending and pay just a fraction of 
the political cost of taxation. Most of the money they spent on public goods comes from 
the “common pool” of resources administered by the central government. So it is 
expected that local authorities use that additional low-cost spending power to remain in 
office. On the other hand, voters have incentives to reward local politicians who are 
effective at extracting resources from the central government. In a setting like this, 
Political Budget Cycles (PBC) may arise even if voter awareness or ability to process 
information is uniformly distributed among provinces. That is, independently of the 
information structure of the game and its cost, local incumbents have incentives to 
manipulate fiscal variables because benefits in terms of constituency support are 
substantially higher than costs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section surveys the empirical literature 
on PBC. Section III discuses some key features of the Argentine federalism and section 
IV looks at the fiscal behavior of Argentine provinces in election and non-election years by 
means of non-parametric tests. Section V describes the two-step econometric strategy to 
study the importance of VFI in argentine political budget cycles while Section VI presents 
the results from panel data estimation. Finally, section VII concludes.  
 
II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
The PBC literature arises basically from observations on the fiscal behavior of incumbents 
in the proximity of elections. Theoretical PBC models, whether driven by adverse 
selection à la Rogoff and Siebert (1988) or spurred by moral hazard considerations as in 
Persson and Tabellini (2000), conclude that incumbents engage in pre-election profligacy 
to influence voters and maximize chances to remain in office1. To a large extent, the 
empirical evidence has been supportive of the central conclusions of the opportunistic 
PBC theory. For example, Schuknecht (2000) analyzing the fiscal performance of 24 
developing countries for the period 1973-1992 finds out that incumbents try to influence 
the electorate augmenting public expenditures rather than lowering taxes. Moreover, his 
estimations back the well known hypothesis that government’s favorite instrument to 
expand fiscal policy is capital spending (public works programs). Brender and Drazen 
(2005) also contribute to the empirics of PBC by examining a data set containing 106 
countries over the period 1960-2001. They found that the observed fiscal deficit cycle in 
their sample was mainly driven by the behavior of new democracies. Actually, when new 
democracies were removed from the sample, PBC disappears. The authors conjecture 
that voters in new democracies have neither the fiscal information nor the ability to 
process it correctly. Conversely, in established democracies relevant data to evaluate 
economic policy are readily available to experienced voters that interpret the information 
properly. Similar results are obtained by Shi and Svensson (2006) from a panel of 85 
countries over a 21-year period. They present evidence of significantly larger and 
statistically more robust budget cycles in developing than in developed countries. The 
authors focused their analysis on budget balance concluding that, on average, fiscal 
deficits as percentage of GDP increases by almost 1% in election years. This empirical 
evidence comes to support a moral hazard model of electoral competition in which voters’ 
inferences from fiscal policy are biased because they observe incumbent’s moves with a 
lag. In their model, PBC are independent from incumbent’s ability and depend exclusively 
on electoral incentives. More accurate, Alt and Lessen (2005) using a sample of 19 
OECD countries in the 1990s, show that PBC is determined by the degree of 
transparency of fiscal policy and not by intrinsic characteristics of specific group of 
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 There are also ideological reasons that could explain budget manipulation before ballots. Polarized political 
environments result in political budget cycles as well.  
countries. In other words, PBC also come out in developed countries showing low 
transparency fiscal policy.  
Single country studies verify PBC too. The analysis of Gonzalez (2000) on Mexico’s fiscal 
policy between 1957 and 1997 revealed that the federal government made systematic 
use of public spending in infrastructure and current transfers as means to earn votes. 
Moreover, Gonzalez sustains that the magnitude of the election cycle was exacerbated 
during the country’s most democratic episodes.  
Subnational-level panel data also support PBC not only for developing countries, which 
might be expected given cross-country evidence, but also for developed ones. As 
reported by Goncalves Veiga & Veiga (2007), majors of Portuguese mainland 
municipalities behave opportunistically in pre-electoral periods increasing total 
expenditures and changing their composition, favoring items that are highly visible to the 
electorate. Same kind of result is obtained by Lema (2008) for Argentine provinces in the 
period 1984-2001. He shows that deficits and public expenditures increase in election 
years and expenditures shift toward more visible public investment and away from current 
consumption goods. His evidence also suggests that governors politically aligned with the 
Executive receive more discretional transfers, allowing provinces to increase spending 
without significant effects over the budget balance2. Evidence on budget manipulation 
also includes episodes of changes in the expenditure composition in election years. As 
stressed by Drazen and Eslava (2010) in their study of Colombian municipalities, 
governments favor targeted expenditures (mainly infrastructure) in detriment of non-
targeted outlays (purchases of supplies and services, payment to other government 
entities, etc.). They found that voters reward incumbents who increase investment 
expenditures but only to the extent that they do so without running large election year 
deficits. 
Subnational jurisdictions of developed countries also display PBC. In their study on the 
fiscal policy of German lánder, Galli and Rossi (2002) conclude that elections affect total 
local spending and several of its categories and also fiscal deficit. Interestingly, they show 
an alternative empirical specification including dummy variables for post electoral and pre 
electoral years with estimated negative coefficients indicating that spending is not 
systematically cut in the post election year but progressively in the following years. In a 
similar fashion, Petry et. al (1999) working with Canadian provinces data, confirm the 
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 Rumi (2007) finds that Argentine central governments discriminate between governors politically affiliated 
with the president and those enrolled in the opposition: while allies receive cash transfers, the others get in-
kind transfers 
existence of electoral cycles in government activity. To reconcile the conjectures from 
cross-country studies that emphasize democracy maturity as key to explain PBC, to this 
evidence from Germany and Canada, asymmetric information on fiscal issues and voter’s 
costs to process fiscal information has to be unevenly distributed across subnational 
units.  
In general, subnational level studies limit their scope to testing political budget cycles and 
finding out which are the fiscal Instruments used by incumbents (taxes, expenditures or 
expenditure composition) to enhance their reelection prospects, assuming implicitly that 
variables explaining opportunistic behavior are the same as the ones causing PBC at 
cross-country level. Only Ahkmedov et al. (2004) in their research on Russia’s regional 
elections present evidence on how the magnitude of the budget cycle decreases as 
voter’s rationality and awareness augment. That is, Russian Federation electorate learns 
as democracy matures.  
Another common feature of PBC empirical studies at subnational level is the absence of 
considerations related to the incentive structure of federalism in the fiscal analysis. This is 
rather surprising given the prominent literature highlighting the impact of vertical fiscal 
imbalance on fiscal discipline (see, for example, Rodden 2002, 2006). Only recently, 
Jones et al. (2012) emphasize the role of vertical fiscal imbalance on argentine 
gubernatorial electoral results. They provide a simple framework where incumbent parties 
use public spending to improve their chances of reelection and voters recompense them 
because that spending is not financed by local taxes but from the common pool 
administered by federal government. Following the same line of reasoning my paper 
extend Jones et al. analysis focusing on the role of VFI on PBC.  
 
III. FISCAL FEDERALISM IN ARGENTINA 
Argentina is constitutionally organized as a federal republic. It has 23 provinces and an 
autonomous federal district, the city of Buenos Aires. The most prominent feature of the 
Argentine federalism is the discrepancy between the high degree centralization regarding 
tax collection, in the sense that a significant amount of tax revenues are under the control 
of the federal government, and the important decentralization on the expenditure side. On 
average, provinces only finance 35% of their outlays with their own taxes, given that they 
are largely responsible for important government functions such as education, health, 
justice, security and sanitation. The remaining 65% of local expenditure is financed by 
federal transfers that are distributed among districts by means of two mechanisms: the 
Federal Tax-Sharing Agreement (FTSA) that assigns cash transfers automatically 
according to percentages established by the Law and the discretionary channel that 
allocates transfers based on political negotiations between the Federal government and 
each province. FTSA accounts for 62% of provincial resources while non-automatic 
transfers represent 7%. 
Changes in the amount of automatic transfers received by provinces depend mostly on 
the business cycle rather than on governor’s actions. Main taxes included in the FTSA, 
like value added and excise taxes, are procyclical, hence their collection and distribution 
among provinces grows sharply in good times and decreases abruptly in bad times. 
Conversely, the distribution of discretionary transfers is mainly related to political 
convenience. Rumi (2005) shows that manipulation of transfers depends on the degree of 
competition faced by the national government in each sub-national government and on its 
strategy to get maximum federal political support at a minimum cost (considering the size 
of each jurisdiction). Most of non-automatic transfers have specific purposes like salaries 
for welfare programs (current transfers) or public works (capital transfers)    
It is well documented that the argentine federal fiscal system provides poor incentives for 
provincial leaders and voters. Saiegh and Tommasi (1999), Saiegh et al. (2001) and 
Spiller and Tommasi (2007) to cite the most relevant, have drawn attention to the high 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalance and its consequences on efficiency and misallocation. 
Provinces behave as if they face a soft budget constraint increasing spending and 
reducing local tax collection effort. Thus, local politicians benefit from spending and pay 
only a small portion of the political cost of taxation. Precisely, a soft budget constraint is 
what they need in election years to remain in office. In addition, citizens have incentives to 
reward governors who are effective at obtaining resources from the central government. 
Profligacy is rewarded at the polls rather than punished because taxpayers do not pay the 
full price of public outlays (Jones et al., 2012). In this setting voters’ behavior does no 
depend on transparency or on the cost of information but on the rules of federal 
distribution regime. So, it is expected that the larger Vertical Fiscal Imbalance the more 
inclined are politicians to behave opportunistically. In other words, opportunism is cheaper 
the larger vertical fiscal imbalance.  
Table 1 shows VFI descriptive statistics for each province over the period 1985-2007. I 
define VFI as local tax collection as percentage of total revenues. From a simple 
inspection of Table 1 it can be verified that VFI varied substantially throughout time and 
districts.  
Table 1. Vertical Fiscal Imbalance 1985- 2007.   
District Average AVG 
Standard 
Deviation 
STD 
Coefficient 
of variability 
STD/AVG 
(%) 
Max Min Range (Max-Min) 
Buenos Aires 47.1 2.2 4.7 52.9 43.9 9.1 
Catamarca 6.0 2.1 34.9 8.9 1.6 7.3 
Chaco 10.3 1.6 15.5 14.3 7.6 6.6 
Chubut 19.6 4.8 24.4 28.6 13.1 15.5 
Córdoba 34.2 4.1 11.9 42.1 26.7 15.3 
Corrientes 10.3 1.2 11.6 12.0 7.2 4.8 
Entre Ríos 22.8 2.5 10.9 28.1 18.5 9.5 
Formosa 4.5 0.6 14.3 5.6 3.4 2.2 
Jujuy 8.7 0.8 8.8 9.7 6.9 2.9 
La Pampa 18.4 2.5 13.8 23.4 10.6 12.8 
La Rioja 4.5 0.8 17.5 5.7 3.0 2.7 
Mendoza 29.1 3.3 11.3 33.8 20.5 13.3 
Misiones 14.2 2.5 17.6 20.3 8.6 11.7 
Neuquén 23.9 9.2 38.3 40.5 12.4 28.1 
Río Negro 21.0 3.2 15.1 25.6 10.5 15.1 
Salta 15.1 3.6 24.0 21.6 7.5 14.1 
San Juan 11.2 2.2 19.5 14.1 5.0 9.0 
San Luis 16.3 2.5 15.5 21.0 12.0 9.0 
Santa Cruz 13.0 3.2 24.7 19.1 7.6 11.5 
Santa Fe 34.0 2.9 8.6 38.8 28.5 10.3 
Santiago del Estero 8.8 1.8 19.9 11.9 4.3 7.6 
Tierra del Fuego 19.6 6.0 30.7 32.1 12.2 19.9 
Tucumán 18.5 2.9 15.9 25.3 10.7 14.5 
City of Buenos Aires 
(CABA) 82.9 3.4 4.1 87.2 74.9 12.3 
Note: Vertical Fiscal Imbalance is local tax collection as percentage of total revenues. 
 
IV. A BRIEF LOOK AT FISCAL BEHAVIOR IN ARGENTINE PROVINCES 
Is there any difference in the fiscal behavior of Argentine districts in election and non –
election years? To give a preliminary answer to this question I carried out several non- 
parametric tests for the following four variables with high probability of being manipulated 
by incumbents in election years: Total Expenditures per capita, Local Tax Collection per 
capita, Budget Balance per capita and the Ratio of Current Expenditures to Direct 
Investment. In Argentine public accounts, expenditures are classified in two broad 
categories: current and capital expenditures. The main component of the former is the 
wage bill while the latter comprises three main grouping: Direct Investment, including 
mostly investment in infrastructure and machinery; Capital Transfers, consisting of 
transfers to the private sector and other entities and Financial Investments containing the 
acquisitions of financial assets. To study manipulation in the composition of spending, I 
concentrate my analysis on the ratio of current expenditures to Direct Investment. 
I performed the Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of population and the two-sample 
Kolmogorv-Smirnov test for equality of distributions for each of the 24 jurisdictions for the 
period 1985-20073. Non- parametric tests provide useful information on the behavior of 
individual districts regarding policy variables. The null hypothesis in both tests is that the 
selected policy variables do not differ significantly during elections and non-elections 
periods. Notice that Argentine governors have agenda power to set the dates of the 
gubernatorial polls which might raise endogeneity concerns. However, election dates are 
rarely anticipated or postponed more than six months and only extraordinarily moved from 
year to another. Therefore, given that I work with annual data, they can be considered 
exogenous.  
The body of table 2 contains the number of districts -and their names- for which the null 
hypothesis is accepted at the 10% level. Results are mostly in line with the PBC 
hypothesis. The nulls of both tests were rejected for the majority of provinces indicating 
that fiscal variables diverge significantly in voting years and non-voting years. In the case 
of the variable Total Expenditures per capita, the null of the equality of population test was 
accepted only for the province of Santa Fe, while the null of Kolmogorov-Smirnov was 
accepted for three provinces: Jujuy, Santa Fe and Santa Cruz. The ratio of Current 
Expenditures to Direct Investment also shows significant differences in election and non-
election years for most of the jurisdictions. The null of Kruskal-Wallis test was accepted 
for Chaco, Jujuy and Río Negro, while the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for Chaco, Misiones 
and Río Negro.  
Similar outcomes were obtained for Local Revenues per capita indicating that election 
years are different from non-election periods. The nulls of both tests of equality of 
population were accepted for Misiones, Santa Fe and Santiago del Estero and the null of 
equality of distribution test was accepted for Buenos Aires, Entre Ríos and Santiago del 
Estero. This is rather unexpected since the overwhelming empirical evidence show that 
incumbents do not manipulate local taxes in election years.  
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 I also performed the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test of equality of population but their results are not presented 
since coincide with those of Kruskal –Wallis.  
The variable Budget Balance per capita shows the higher number of provinces for which 
the null is accepted in both tests. The null of Kruskal-Wallis and Kolgomorov-Smirnov 
tests are accepted for four and seven provinces respectively. A plausible explanation is 
that Budget Balance might have been endogenous in several districts and years 
exhibiting fiscal deficit. That is, governors run deficits or not depending on the availability 
of discretionary transfers to cover fiscal gaps.  
Table 2. Do fiscal variables differ in elections and non-elections years? Kruskal-
Wallis and Kolmorov-Smirnov Tests.  
Provinces for which the null Hypothesis is accepted (Number of districts in 
parenthesis) 
Tests 
Total 
Expenditures per 
capita 
Local Tax 
Collection per 
capita 
Budget Balance 
per capita 
Ratio of Current 
Expenditures to 
Direct Investment 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
Santa Fe 
(1) 
Santa Fe, 
Santiago del 
Estero, Misiones 
(3) 
Misiones,  San 
Juan, San Luis, 
Tucumán 
(4) 
Chaco, Jujuy, Río 
Negro 
(3) 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov 
Santa Fe, Jujuy, 
Santa Cruz 
(3) 
Buenos Aires, 
Entre Ríos, 
Santiago del 
Estero 
(3) 
Buenos Aires, 
Córdoba, 
Formosa, La 
Rioja, Misiones, 
Salta, Santa Fe 
(7) 
Chaco, Misiones, 
Río Negro 
(3) 
Note:  H0:  fiscal variables do not differ in election and non-election years. Null hypothesis accepted at 10% 
level. Total number of districts: 24 
 
V. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Kruskal-Wallis and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests provide useful insights on the behavior of 
fiscal variables in election and non elections years, but they have obvious limitations. To 
begin with, they have asymptotic properties which impose prudence when dealing with 
relatively small samples. Moreover, non parametric tests are intrinsically univariate which 
calls for a more sophisticated analysis. To test the existence of PBC and the conjectured 
connection between the structure of federalism and budget manipulation, I estimate a 
panel data following a simple two-step strategy.  Firstly I test for budget manipulation in 
Argentina by means of the usual baseline equation estimated in Political Budget Cycles 
(PBC) studies. That is, key fiscal variables (Fit) depend on the timing of elections, the 
lagged value of fiscal variables (Fit-1) and several socioeconomic and political controls to 
account for variability in the data due to factors other than elections.  
εββββ itjitjititit CONTROLSYEARELECTIONFF +++= +− 32110   (I) 
Where i indexes jurisdictions and t represents time that goes from 1985 to 2007. I 
consider 22 of the 24 argentine districts. I excluded the province of Tierra del Fuego and 
the Federal District from my analysis because their governors were appointed by the 
President of the Nation until 1991 and 1996 respectively, which impede the identification 
of incumbent governors for various elections4.  
Secondly, provided that budget manipulation is confirmed for one or more fiscal variables, 
I introduce the variable Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI) interacted with the election year 
dummy, coded ELECTION YEAR, to assess the importance of argentine federal 
structures on PBC. That is,  
εβββββ itjitjitititit CONTROLSYEARELECTIONVFIYEARELECTIONFF it ++++= +− 432110 * (II) 
V.1. Dependent variables 
I consider four policy instruments subject to potential manipulation by incumbents: Total 
Expenditures per capita, Local Taxes Collection per capita, Budget Balance per capita 
and the Ratio of Current Expenditures to Direct Investment.  
V.2. Election Year variable 
A key variable in my analysis is the ELECTION YEAR dummy. According to the PBC 
theory, voting years are associated with fiscal deficit, increasing outlays and decreasing 
local tax collection. Likewise, following Eslava and Drazen (2010) ELECTION YEAR 
should be negative correlated with the ratio of Current Expenditures to Direct Investment. 
Their argument is that spending shifts towards goods attractive to voters like infrastructure 
in the attempt to convince voters that the incumbent shares their spending priorities. 
The usual problem in PBC studies caused by the lack of coincidence between the fiscal 
year and the election year is ameliorated in the case of Argentina since 62.4% of the 
elections in our data set were carried out in September and October and 81% from June 
to December5. I consider that five months is enough time to attempt influencing local 
constituencies through budget manipulation so I define t as an election year if the voting 
ballot was carried out from June to December.  
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 Tierra del Fuego had the status of National Territory, dependent of the Federal government, until 1991. 
Similarly, the City of Buenos Aires acquired the status of autonomous after the constitutional reform of 1994.  
5
 On election dates, see Table 1A in the Appendix. 
Since democracy was recovered in 1983, gubernatorial elections took place regularly in 
most of the 24 districts every four years. My data set includes six elections from 1983 to 
2007. I only excluded the 1983 election because there was no party allied with the military 
regime and therefore there was no incumbent in that election. 
V.3. Controlling for political and socioeconomic influences  
My empirical study controls for three sources of political influences on fiscal policy 
variables: the coincidence of presidential and gubernatorial elections, the influence of 
party obedience when the governor and the President belong to the same party and the 
direct intervention of the central government on some provinces facing political turmoil. 
Notice that subnational analysis allows me to control for historic and cultural variables at 
country level that may affect my explanatory variables. 
I construct a dummy variable coded DATE that takes the value 1 when gubernatorial 
elections are held the same date as presidential elections and 0 otherwise. Before the 
constitutional reform, in 1994, Presidential elections were held every six years and 
gubernatorial every four years which implied concurrent polls (the same year, although 
not necessarily the same date) every twelve years. The reform introduced a four year 
period for President opening the possibility of full coincidence with gubernatorial elections 
(same day and month) since some governors, using their agenda power could set 
election dates to coincide with President’s election6. The coincidence of Presidential and 
Gubernatorial elections gives local incumbents a great opportunity to position themselves 
in the national game and enhance their power in their provinces so I anticipate these 
years to show higher expenditures, lower local tax collection and budget deficits.  
Jones, Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2000) in their study on Argentina’s fiscal federalism 
found that provinces where the governor is affiliated to the same party as the President 
spent less than those leaded by the opposition. They conjecture that provincial governors 
politically allied with the President are more likely to internalize the effect of spending an 
additional unit of national resources due to internal party discipline. Even in a scenario of 
weak party obedience, allied governors may take advantage, in terms of electoral results, 
in supporting national policies aimed at controlling spending and fiscal deficit. To capture 
that effect, I include the dummy variable called SAME PARTY that takes the value 1 if the 
governor of a given province is allied with the President and 0 otherwise. The codification 
of this variable was not straightforward. The fracture of the two most important parties (PJ 
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 This agenda power does not guarantee coincidence since governors could choose to move Gubernatorial 
Polls away from Presidential Elections. Another variable explaining the lack of coincidence between both 
elections after the constitutional reform of 1994 was federal intervention. 
and Alianza UCR/FREPASO) resulted in some atypical alliances. In the years following 
the 2001/2002 crisis, there was a major break in the peronist party that ruled the country 
in the periods 1989-1999 and 2002-2007. One of the factions, leaded by the Governor of 
the small San Luis province, Adolfo Rodríguez Saa, became the opposition of President 
Kirchner, head of the winning faction. The other main party, the Alianza UCR/FEPASO 
also shattered and one of the groups joined Kirchner. I also account for the agreements 
between some provincial parties and the incumbent President during the 90’s7. 
The so-called “Federal Intervention” is another source of influence on policy variables. 
The Argentine Constitution allows the federal government to take control of a province in 
certain extreme cases of social commotion. Federal intervention is declared by the 
President with the agreement of the National Congress. Upon intervention, one or more 
branches of the provincial government are dissolved, and the federal government 
appoints a new authority (called interventor) who serves for a short term until order is 
reestablished. I expect the interventor to improve the budget balance, diminishing total 
expenditures, augmenting local taxes and decreasing the ratio of current to capital 
expenditures. The dummy variable FEDERAL INTERVENTION takes the value 1 if the 
President declares the intervention of a given district and 0 otherwise. In the lapse 1983-
2007 there were six episodes of federal intervention, two of them on the Province of 
Corrientes in the years 1992-1993 and 2000-2001 and the others on the provinces of 
Catamarca (1991), Tucumán (1991) and Santiago del Estero (1994)8.  
Socioeconomic conditions may also affect subnational fiscal performance, thus I include 
five control variables in several specifications of the proposed baseline equation: the rate 
of growth of GDP per capita, the level of GDP per capita, infant mortality rate, Budget 
balance lagged one period and Vertical Fiscal Imbalance. I expect growing and richer 
districts to have higher levels of expenditure and revenues per capita and also a higher 
proportion of capital expenditures relative to current outlays than low-income districts. 
Likewise, provinces exhibiting high Infant mortality rate are expected to force governors to 
augment public outlays and lower local tax pressure. On the other hand, Budget Balance 
per capita lagged one period is expected to influence next year fiscal behavior. In the 
context of financial limitations suffered by Argentine provinces in most of the period under 
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 In years 2003 and 2004, I coded 1 the provinces of Mendoza, Río Negro and Catamarca, administered by 
UCR governors allied with the Peronist President Kirchner (called “Radicales K”. In contrast, the province of 
San Luis was coded 0 despite being administered by the peronist governor Rodríguez Saa. During the 1996-
1999 I coded 1 the provinces of Tucumán and Tierra del Fuego to account for the alliances of Fuerza 
Republicana and Partido Popular Fueguino with President Menem (Peronist). 
8
 The Federal Government took control of the Province of Corrientes twice, from February 1992 to December 
1993, and from December 1999 to December 2001. Catamarca was intervened from January to December 
1991; Tucumán, from January to October 1991 and Santiago del Estero from December 1993 to July 1995.  
study, with the exception of 1993-94 and 1996-99, high fiscal deficit in t-1 demand 
corrective measures like diminishing public outlays and increasing local tax collection in t.  
Finally, I anticipate lower values of VFI (meaning low local tax collection) to be associated 
with fiscal expansion and high ratios of current outlays to direct investment. Nonetheless, 
this effect may be offset by the fact that most capital transfers from the federal 
government to the provinces are earmarked.  
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the variables included in the econometric 
estimations. The coding of each variable is shown in the Appendix9.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics. Period: 1985- 2007  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Expenditure per capita 506 2278.2 1365.4 592 12452.8 
Local Revenues per capita 506 304.8 185.9 27.6 1369.3 
Budget Balance 506 -133.7 314.2 -1339.0 873.3 
Ratio of Current Expenditure to 
Direct Investment  506 8.0 8.0 1.0 118.7 
Political and Socio economic controls 
Federal Intervention  506 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Same Party 506 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Same Date 506 0.055 0.23 0 1 
GDP per capita  506 331.6 199.4 96.4 1221.8 
Rate of Growth of GDP per capita 506 2.05 11.79 -30.05 46.3 
Budget Balance lagged one period 506 -145.62 308.41 -1339.0 862.7` 
Infant Mortality Rate  506 21.7 6.8 9.3 46.6 
PBC key variables 
Election Year  506 0.26 0.44 0 1 
VFI  506 16.5 10.8 1.6 52.9 
Note: numbers of districts: 22; numbers of periods: 23 
 
VI. RESULTS  
Table 4 presents estimations of the typical PBC equation for the selected fiscal 
instruments. Regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7) display the estimations of the full model for 
each independent fiscal variable while regression (2), (4) (6) and (8) only contain control 
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 See Table 2A 
variables that pass the .10 level of significance, so they are the ones upon which I base 
my conclusions. As already remarked, all the models include lagged dependent variables 
to capture the rigidity of the budget from one year to another, thus I estimate using the 
dynamic panel technique developed by Arellano and Bond with robust standard errors10.  
VI.1. Do incumbents manipulate fiscal variables? If so, which are the instruments they 
manipulate? 
My estimations show strong evidence that incumbent manipulate fiscal variables in 
election years. Governors increase expenditures, run budget deficits and change the 
expenditure composition favoring investment in infrastructure and machinery to remain in 
power. Comparing to non-gubernatorial election years, total expenditures rise, on 
average, 78 pesos per capita in election years, which means an increment of 3.4% with 
respect to the average expenditure per capita of the sample. I also find that Budget 
Balance per capita deteriorates 50.3% and the Ratio of Current Expenditures to Direct 
Investment diminishes 18.3% in election years relative to their respective sample 
averages. As in most of the PBC empirical studies I find that the coefficient of ELECYEAR 
in the Local Revenues per Capita regression is not significant at usual levels indicating 
that incumbents do not resort to local taxes to enhance their chances to remain in office.  
It is also observed in Table 4 that lagged dependent variables are statistical significant at 
customary levels in all equations, which support the choice of the model and confirm that 
inertia is very important in budgetary studies. Variables controlling for socioeconomic 
conditions are statistical significant too and present the anticipated sign in most of the 
regressions. The positive and significant coefficients of the rate of growth of GDP per 
capita and the level of GDP per capita in regressions (2) and (4) verify the role of the 
business cycle in the evolution of expenditures and local tax collection. Likewise, as GDP 
per capita augments, the ratio of current expenditure to direct investment diminishes 
indicating that public investment is typically stimulated in expansions and adjusted 
downwards in recessions. Unsurprisingly, the estimated coefficient of Budget Balance per 
capita lagged one period is always in the hypothesized direction and significant at the .01 
level. Similarly, the estimated coefficients for Infant Mortality Rate is positively related to 
Total Expenditures per capita and negatively with Budget Balance per capita, Local 
Revenues per capita and the Ratio of Current Expenditure to Direct Investment. Instead, 
VFI has a negative impact on Budget Balance and positive on expenditure composition 
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 As robustness check I also estimate equations I and II by OLS with fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
Results are displayed in the Appendix, Tables 3A and 4A.  
and Local Revenues per capita, but fails to detect any noteworthy relationship with 
Expenditures per capita.  
The performance of the variables representing political controls is rather mixed. On one 
hand, none of them reach the .10 significance threshold in the regression explaining 
Expenditures per capita, but on the other hand SAME PARTY shows statistical significant 
and the expected sign in the Local Revenues per capita and Budget Balance per capita 
regressions and DATE in the expenditure mix estimation. INTERVENTION is significant in 
regressions 4, 6 and 8 indicating that federal control of provinces under turmoil 
contributes to improve local tax collection and budget balance as well as the expenditure 
mix, favoring investment.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
VI.2. What is the role of VFI in the fitted PBC equations?  
GMM estimations presented in Table 5 support my conjecture about the role of VFI on 
expenditure per capita and expenditure composition during election years. Regression (2) 
shows that the interaction term VFI*ELECTION YEAR is negative and statistically 
significant indicating that the tendency of incumbents to manipulate expenditures to 
remain in office is stronger in subnational districts showing large degrees of VFI. That is, 
the smaller the local tax collection relative to total revenues in election years, the higher 
expenditures per capita.  
The effect of VFI on expenditure mix during election years is best captured by regression 
(7). The coefficient of the interaction term VFI*ELECTION YEAR is negative and 
statistical significant which means that provinces showing large degree of VFI (i.e. local 
tax collection as percentage of total revenues is small) increase current expenditures 
relative to direct investment in election years. This result suggests that there are two 
opposite forces at work during election years. There is a “pure effect of opportunism” that 
incentives incumbents to rise “visible” outlays (Direct Investment) in detriment of current 
expenditures because constituencies want to get what they pay for. This is the Drazen 
and Eslava (2010) result and also my findings for Argentina reported in Table 4. Leaving 
aside considerations on the social rate of return of public investment, this effect can be 
termed as “positive” for constituencies since elections impulse incumbents to favor 
investment over current expenditures. 
There exists also a “VFI effect” that discourages constituencies to control the allocation of 
resources from the “common pool” (since they pay only a portion of them) and tempt 
governors to spend on salaries, contracts (personnel in general) and other forms of 
current expenditure to get the support of selected groups. This effects can be dubbed as 
“negative” for the province because boosts current spending in detriment of investment.  
Estimations reveal that the total impact of VFI on outlays composition (considering both 
the direct effect and the interaction term) is positive. Conversely, the total impact of 
ELECTION YEAR on the Ratio of Current Expenditures to Direct Investment is -1.44 
signifying that the “pure opportunism effect” prevails over the “VFI effect”.  
Table 5 also shows that the interaction term VFI*ELECTION YEAR fails to be significantly 
related to the variables Budget Balance per capita and Local Revenues per capita. As 
already mentioned, the budget result can be considered endogenous in several districts 
and years due to previously agreed discretionary transfers to cover fiscal gaps. Regarding 
Local revenues, it is generally accepted that incumbents avoid upsetting their 
constituencies in election years with increases in tax pressure.  
 [Table 5 about here] 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper calls the attention on the incentive structure of fiscal federalism to explain PBC 
at subnational district level in Argentina. I find that expansions in expenditures per capita 
and changes in expenditure composition, favoring current expenditures in detriment of 
investment, in election years are driven by Vertical Fiscal Imbalance. Local incumbents 
take advantage of resources collected by the central government for which they pay just a 
fraction of the political cost of taxation. Rather than punish profligacy and opportunism at 
the polls, voters have incentives to reward incumbents at playing the political game of 
extracting resources from the “common pool”   
The incentive structure governing the distribution of federal resources between the central 
government and provinces has been an important topic in the fiscal federalism literature 
but largely ignored by PBC empirical studies dealing with cross-province data. They 
explain budget fluctuations in election years by relying on arguments resulting from cross-
country studies, like the dispersion of the costs of processing fiscal information and/or the 
different degree of voter’s awareness across units of observation, to explain budget 
fluctuations in election years. Though these explanations are also plausible for 
subnational studies I demonstrate that they are not unique. Thus, by making evident the 
role of Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in elucidating Argentinean PBC this paper builds a bridge 
between these apparently unconnected literatures.  
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Data Sources 
The data set for this study was compiled from diverse sources. Fiscal variables at 
constant 2004 prices were drawn from the Dirección Nacional de Coordinación Fiscal con 
las Provincias, Secretaría de Hacienda, Ministerio de Economía de la Nación. Provincial 
GDP at constant prices originated from the Bureau of Statistics of each province and from 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata estimations, based on official figures. Population data 
were taken from the INDEC (the Argentinean Bureau of Statistics) and Infant Mortality 
rate figures from Ministerio de Salud. Electoral data come from Dirección Nacional 
Electoral, Ministerio del Interior and the Electoral Map of Andy Tow.  
 
 
Table 4. Do Incumbent governors manipulate fiscal variables? 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Expenditures per capita Local Revenues per capita 
Ratio Current 
Expenditures to Direct 
Investment 
Budget Balance per capita  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXPENDITUREt-1 0.7694*** (0.0605) 0.7774*** (0.0588)       
REVENUESt-1   0.5329*** (0.0586) 0.5216*** (0.059)     
RATIOCDIt-1     0.4844*** (0.0222) 0.5019*** (0.0199)   
BUDGET BALANCEt-1   0.5987*** (0.1171) 0.6095*** (0.1169) 0.0383*** (0.0126) 0.0387*** (0.0126) -0.0039*** (0.0011) -0.0043*** (0.0012) 0.3259*** (0.0502) 0.3463*** (0.0521) 
ELECTION YEARt 74.6783*** (25.8696) 77.6299*** (26.5516) 0.6918 (2.6422) 0.3739 (2.7154) -1.3842*** (0.412) -1.4657*** (0.4378) -66.8875** (27.8586) -67.3192*** (25.4678) 
VFIt 8.4371 (7.1398)  12.5482*** (1.5806) 12.4219*** (1.5961) 0.4413*** (0.1137) 0.4266*** (0.1081) -12.1678* (6.6342) -12.1719* (6.5228) 
GDP per capitat 2.2758*** (0.8281) 2.3416*** (0.8236) 0.5244*** (0.1524) 0.5287*** (0.1517) -0.0099 (0.0072) -0.1538*** (0.055) 0.2873 (0.3263) 4.5963*** (1.2328) 
Rate of Growth of GDP per capitat 3.9654** (1.9591) 3.4512* (2.0511) 0.7209** (0.2923) 0.7454** (0.2925) -0.1374*** (0.0478)  3.892*** (1.1403)  
INFANT MORTALITY RATEt 9.6745* (5.6052) 8.7273 (5.6292) -1.7949** (0.734) -1.8844** (0.7701) -0.2737** (0.1171) -0.2496** (0.1037) -14.532*** (4.7107) -14.4843*** (4.6281) 
SAME DATEt 100.4337 (79.6206)  -12.5467 (11.009)  -1.4513** (0.6425) -1.6692** (0.6641) -79.2936 (53.4604)  
SAME PARTYt -24.3023 (33.5354)  14.0492** (5.5852) 13.4927** (5.661) -0.0620 (0.3207)  117.1578*** (32.9328) 114.757*** (33.726) 
FEDERAL INTERVENTIONt -100.5234 (81.1489)  23.8686*** (6.4327) 22.9679*** (6.6086) 2.8886* (1.5068) 2.9431* (1.5476) 198.2757 (55.2092) 192.909*** (55.0468) 
Constant -471.382 (394.5138) -358.1058 (352.412) -196.842*** (54.3787) -191.188*** (56.6381) 6.2994 (3.3418) 2.5828** (1.2524) 277.9186 (137.8999) 370.895*** (137.0822) 
Test that average autocovariance in 
residuals of order 1 is 0.  Pr>z= 0.0030 0.0033 0.0046 0.0041 0.0306 0.0308 0.0008 0.0009 
Test that average autocovariance in 
residuals of order 2 is 0.   Pr>z= 0.3296 0.2578 0.5287 0.5121 0.3627 0.3635 0.7227 0.4959 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10.  Observations (N)= 506. 
Table 5. What is the source of PBC in Argentina? The role of VFI 
Variable 
Dependent Variables 
Expenditures per capita Local Revenues per capita Ratio Current Expenditures to Direct Investment  Budget Balance per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXPENDITUREt-1 0.7678*** (0.0603) 
0.7785*** 
(0.0613)       
REVENUESt-1   0.5328*** (0.0585) 
0.5216*** 
(0.0590)     
RATIOCDIt-1     0.5033*** (0.0235) 
0.5241*** 
(0.0191)   
BUDGET BALANCEt-1 0.6020*** (0.1142) 
0.6077*** 
(0.1138) 
0.0384*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0388*** 
(0.0126) 
-0.0038*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0041*** 
(0.0012) 
0.3233*** 
(0.0503) 
0.3443*** 
(0.0524) 
ELECTION YEARt 173.9003*** (50.3956) 164.554 3.4821 3.8293 0.9331 1.075 -1.10E+02 -1.00E+02 
 
164.554***
(48.9511)
3.4821 
(5.7864) 
3.8293 
(5.6008) 
0.9331 
( . 226) 
1.075 
( .7135) 
-106.1603** 
(41.7876) 
-102.309*** 
(39.5161) 
VFIt 9.1977 (7.2046) 10.2992 12.5627 12.446 0.4561 0.4462 -12.5094 -12.4954 
 
10.2992 
(7.2115) 
12.5627*** 
(1.5963) 
12.446*** 
(1.6134) 
0.4561*** 
(0.1159) 
0.4462*** 
(0.1102) 
-12.5094* 
(6.8028) 
-12.4954* 
(6.6346) 
VFIt* ELECTION YEARt -5.9179*** (2.0822) 5.3971 -0.1631 -0.2016 -0.138 -0.1468 2.3344 2.076 
 
-5.3971*** 
(1.9011) 
-0.1631 
(0.3308) 
-0.2016 
(0.3129) 
-0.138*** 
(0.0438) 
-0.1468*** 
0.0435) 
2.3344* 
(1.3732) 
2.076 
(1.3060) 
GDP per capitat 2.2813*** (0.8192) 
2.2801*** 
(0.8211) 
0.5242*** 
(0.1523) 
0.5284*** 
(0.1515) 
-0.0092 
(0.0069)  
0.2927 
(0.3287)  
Rate of Growth of GDP per capitat 3.9889** (2.0023) 
3.4832* 
2.0332) 
0.7237** 
(0.2925) 
0.7482** 
(0.2924) 
-0.1368*** 
(0.0460) 
-0.1515*** 
(0.0528) 
3.8607*** 
(1.1574) 
4.5846*** 
(1.2453) 
INFANT MORTALITY RATEt 9.6737* (5.6094) 
9.896* 
(5.6522) 
-1.7979** 
(0.7326) 
-1.8858** 
(0.7689) 
-0.2617** 
(0.1093) 
-0.2317** 
(0.0980) 
-14.6142*** 
(4.7135) 
-14.5561*** 
(4.6288) 
SAME DATEt 107.9915 (79.3658)  
-12.30 
(11.2436)  
-1.2748** 
(0.5739) 
-1.4158** 
0.5822) 
-82.2219 
(53.6733)  
SAME PARTYt -23.9622 (32.6850)  
13.9964** 
(5.5714) 
13.4497** 
(5.6673) 
-0.0859 
(0.03109)  
117.437*** 
(33.0506) 
114.932*** 
33.7956) 
FEDERAL INTERVENTIONt  -122.2679 (86.1419)  
23.3679*** 
(7.0074) 
22.346*** 
(7.0287) 
2.3134 
(1.4269)  
205.764*** 
(57.5396) 
199.454*** 
(56.8076) 
Constant -482.0211 (392.6137) 0E+02 -2.00E+02 -1.90E+02 5.4377 1.7272 283.1772 377.3903 
 
-535.341 
(408.4632) 
-196.904*** 
(54.6433) 
-191.452*** 
(56.9021) 
5.4377* 
(3.209 ) 
1.7272 
(1.2136) 
283.1772** 
(139.9138) 
377.390*** 
(139.6356) 
Test that average autocovariance in 
residuals of order 1 is 0.  Pr>z= 0.0032 0.0034 0.0048 0.0043 0.0283 0.0272 0.0008 0.0009 
Test that average autocovariance in 
residuals of order 2 is 0.   Pr>z= 0.3402 0.2699 0.5433 0.5368 0.3588 0.3736 0.7629 0.5156 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10. Observations (N)= 506.  
Appendix  
 
Table 1 A. The timing of elections from 1985 to 2007. Number of gubernatorial elections 
carried out in a given month. 
Month Number of Elections Percentage 
January 0 0.0 
February 0 0.0 
March 1 0.9 
April 2 1.7 
May 19 16.2 
June 7 6.0 
July 1 0.9 
August 8 6.8 
September 52 44.4 
October 21 17.9 
November 3 2.6 
December 3 2.6 
Total number of elections 117 100.0 
 
Note: Two-thirds (67.5%) of the gubernatorial elections (24 districts) took place in the last four months of the year. 
 Table 2A. Definition of Variables  
Type of 
variable 
Variable Definition 
Dependent 
EXPENDITUREit 
Real Total Expenditure per capita for province i in year t. 
(pesos of 2004 per inhabitant) 
REVENUESit Real Revenues from local taxes per capita for province i in year t. (pesos of 2004 per inhabitant) 
BUDGET BALANCEit 
Real Budget Balance per capita in province i in year t. 
(pesos of 2004 per inhabitant) 
RATIOCDIit Ratio of Current Expenditures to Direct Investment for province i in year t. (pesos of 2004) 
Key 
independent 
variable 
ELECTION YEARit Dummy variable that equals 1 in governor’s election year and 0 otherwise.  
VFIit Vertical Fiscal Imbalance: Local tax collection as 
percentage of total revenues in province i in period t. 
SAME PARTYit 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the governor of 
province i at period t is affiliated to the same party of the 
President, and 0 otherwise. 
INTERVENTIONit 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if province i in year 
t was intervened by the Federal Government and 0 
otherwise  
GDPit 
Real GDP per capita of province i in year t. (pesos of 2004 
per inhabitant) 
Growth GDPit Rate of Growth of Real GDP per capita of province i in year t. 
IMRit 
Infant Mortality Rate in province i in year t. (per thousand 
live birth) 
BUDGET BALANCEit-
1 
Real Budget Balance per capita of province i in year t-1. 
(pesos of 2004 per inhabitant) 
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Table 3 A. Do Incumbent governors manipulate fiscal variables? Robustness Check. Estimation Method: OLS with fixed-effects.  
Robust Standard Errors   
Variable 
Dependent Variables 
Expenditures per capita Local Revenues per capita 
Ratio Current 
Expenditures to Direct 
Investment  
Budget Balance per 
capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXPENDITUREt-1 0.7864*** (0.0750) 
0.7762*** 
(0.0756)       
REVENUESt-1   0.6083*** (0.0575) 
0.6242*** 
(0.0549)     
RATIOCDIt-1     0.5683*** (0.0197) 
0.5702*** 
(0.0193)   
BUDGET BALANCEt-1 0.5304*** (0.1568) 
0.5022*** 
(0.1587) 
0.0357** 
(0.0143) 
0.0385*** 
(0.0134) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0034*** 
(0.0011) 
0.3833*** 
(0.0697) 
0.3963*** 
(0.0699 
ELECTION YEARt 82.0353*** (25.1871) 
85.0249*** 
(26.3591) 
0.5410 
(2.8626) 
-0.0174 
(3.0187) 
-1.3196*** 
(0.4459) 
-1.3722*** 
(0.4810) 
-69.6061** 
(28.2911) 
-71.0631** 
(26.5334) 
VFIt 
10.6113 
(6.5474)  
9.9953*** 
(1.5749) 
9.9950*** 
(1.5854) 
0.1842*** 
(0.0507) 
0.1693*** 
(0.0432) 
-8.6410* 
(4.4632) 
-8.8790* 
(4.4538) 
GDP per capitat-1 1.7837** (0.6867) 
1.8927** 
(0.7013) 
0.4195*** 
(0.1333) 
0.4064*** 
(0.1356) 
-0.0009 
(0.0024)  
0.2177 
(0.2879)  
Rate of Growth of GDP per capitat 4.7071*** (1.3030) 
3.7544*** 
(1.3186) 
1.0700*** 
(0.2422) 
1.1552*** 
(0.2414) 
-0.1222** 
(0.0475) 
-0.1211** 
(0.0486) 
3.2601*** 
(1.0470) 
3.8338*** 
(1.1142) 
INFANT MORTALITY RATEt-1 4.9363 (3.7559)  
-0.7017 
(0.5285)  
-0.1917*** 
(0.0689) 
-0.1862*** 
(0.0639) 
-7.6667*** 
(2.3614) 
-7.6667*** 
(2.3226) 
SAME DATEt 107.613 (81.0086)  
-9.6818 
(11.3724)  
-0.9934 
(0.5838)  
-87.4674 
(58.3390)  
SAME PARTYt -27.2876 (23.6505)  
10.9507** 
(4.7207) 
12.0725** 
(4.8271) 
-0.1091 
(0.2794)  
95.0620*** 
(24.8022) 
93.2446*** 
(25.6394) 
FEDERAL INTERVENTIONt  -34.0097 (42.2334)  
19.6454*** 
(5.5525) 
17.0337*** 
(5.8134) 
2.7151** 
(1.0495) 
2.6203** 
(1.0750) 
154.1719*** 
(42.2783) 
144.7131*** 
(43.3356) 
Constant -298.398 (418.544) 
-39.2482 
(308.1851) 
-164.617*** 
(49.3998) 
-180.596*** 
(42.8683) 
5.0834** 
(2.0133) 
4.7992*** 
(1.4588) 
124.8768** 
(155.364) 
198.6117* 
(113.0647) 
R2 within 0.6433 0.6359 0.8552 0.8540 0.4395 0.4384 0.3061 0.3003 
R2 between 0.9244 0.9440 0.8959 0.8940 0.8785 0.8716 0.0880 0.0948 
R2 overall 0.8789 0.8940 0.8509 0.8501 0.5522 0.5502 0.2509 0.2577 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10. Observations (N)= 506. 
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Table 4 A. What is the source of PBC in Argentina? The role of VFI. Robustness Check.  Estimation Method: OLS with fixed-effects. 
Robust Standard Errors 
Variable 
Dependent Variables 
Expenditures per capita Local Revenues per capita Ratio Current Expenditures to Direct Investment Budget Balance per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EXPENDITUREt-1 0.7854*** (0.0748) 
0.7758*** 
(0.0768)       
REVENUESt-1   0.6083*** (0.0576) 
0.6243*** 
(0.0550)     
BUDGET BALANCEt-1 0.5331*** (0.1551) 
0.4965*** 
(0.1571) 
0.0358** 
(0.0144) 
0.0386*** 
(0.0135) 
0.3892*** 
(0.0701) 
0.3953*** 
(0.0702) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0011) 
RATIOCDIt-1       0.5864*** (0.0240) 
0.5871*** 
(0.0237) 
ELECTION YEARt 184.9163*** (55.3440) 
174.5845*** 
(58.1755) 
2.6898 
(5.8804) 
2.3825 
(5.6818) 
-105.408** 
(42.0257) 
-102.8334** 
(41.1590) 
1.1921 
(0.8192) 
1.1849 
(0.8319) 
VFIt 11.7413* (6.6836) 
9.8893* 
(5.6491) 
10.0191*** 
(1.5897) 
10.0218*** 
(1.6001) 
-9.0476* 
(4.6172) 
-9.2571* 
(4.5583) 
0.2084*** 
(0.0506) 
0.1972*** 
(0.0433) 
VFIt * ELECTION YEARt -6.1416** (2.3499) 
-5.5195** 
(2.3226) 
-0.1283 
(0.3322) 
-0.1430 
(0.3065) 
2.1375 
(1.3744) 
1.8920 
(1.3426) 
-0.1508*** 
(0.0498) 
-0.1532*** 
(0.0513) 
GDP per capitat-1 1.7866** (0.6822) 
1.8226** 
(0.7058) 
0.4194*** 
(1.3334) 
0.4064*** 
(0.1356) 
0.2181 
(0.2897) 
3.8112*** 
(1.1216) 
-0.0006 
(0.0023)  
Rate of Growth of GDP per capitat 4.7896*** (1.3289) 
3.8116*** 
(1.2701) 
1.0721*** 
(0.2445) 
1.1569*** 
(0.2430) 
3.2263*** 
(1.0601) 
3.8112*** 
(1.1216) 
-0.1209** 
(0.0455) 
-0.1199** 
(0.0467) 
INFANT MORTALITY RATEt-1 4.9359 (3.6914)  
-0.7012 
(0.5282)  
-7.6740*** 
(2.3641) 
-7.6787*** 
(2.3210) 
-0.1845*** 
(0.0641) 
-0.1793*** 
(0.0600) 
SAME DATEt 115.5006 (80.9864)  
-9.5217 
(11.6381)  
-90.1418 
(58.9362)  
-0.7974 
(0.4967)  
SAME PARTYt -28.8751 (23.5434)  
10.9199** 
(4.6901) 
12.0422 
(4.8094) 
95.5766*** 
(24.8747) 
93.6374*** 
(25.7076) 
-0.1462 
(0.2593)  
FEDERAL INTERVENTIONt  -51.3090 (45.3482)  
19.2835*** 
(5.6734) 
16.6465*** 
(5.7664) 
160.2012*** 
(43.9084) 
149.8272*** 
(44.3640) 
2.2293** 
(0.9748) 
2.1456** 
(1.0078) 
Constant -314.9568 (418.9032) 
-178.7619 
(344.858) 
-164.9943*** 
(49.7247) 
-186.019*** 
(43.1535) 
131.1692 
(156.2672) 
204.545* 
(114.765) 
4.3332** 
(1.8417) 
4.0756*** 
(1.3278) 
R2 within 0.6460 0.6398 0.8553 0.8541 0.3073 0.3012 0.4498 0.4490 
R2 between 0.9257 0.9246 0.8960 0.8941 0.0940 0.1006 0.8886 0.8853 
R2 overall 0.8804 0.8783 0.8511 0.8502 0.2543 0.2605 0.5629 0.5618 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10. Observations (N)= 506. 
